The false start of short selling in China’s equity markets, known as the A-share market, has the feeling of déjà vu all over again. In 2006, the market was abuzz with the opening of the China Financial Futures Exchange, which was established to be the first exchange for the listing and trading of index futures contracts, as well as other financial derivatives. The Futures Exchange would allow investors for the first time to hedge their long exposure as well as to speculate and profit from drops in the underlying indexes, upon which the futures contracts are based. It was widely believed, based on comments from the CSRC, that index futures would begin trading by the start of 2007. By late 2007, CSRC Chairman Shang Fulin stated that all systems and technical issues had been completed, but final “preparations” were still needed. The New Year came and went. Once again the market speculated that futures trading would begin following the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games with contracts to be based on the CSI 300, a market-cap weighted index representing the 300 largest companies in the A-share market. The next speculated launch date was the start of 2009. Today, the Futures Exchange’s own website states that “it won’t be long for the CSI 300 index futures...to be launched.” Many investors are wondering why index futures trading has not yet occurred.
Bond futures unsuccessful
China’s unsuccessful experiment with a bond futures market in the mid-1990s goes a long way to explain why index futures trading has been so slow in launching and why short selling is even further away from being a reality.
In late 1992, China launched a market in government bond futures. Due to insufficient institutional interest, the market was opened to the public in 1993. However, it was plagued by rampant price-manipulation and collusion, frenzied and chaotic speculation, and weak governance. In one example of the many problems, price manipulators who held long spot positions colluded before government bond futures matured by accumulating large positions in long futures without the intention to offset. This caused spot prices to rise sharply. Instead of creating a more transparent and stable market for government bonds, the bond futures contracts actually led to higher market volatility, causing painful disruptions in the spot market. As there were no securities laws, and a lax and ever-evolving regulatory environment, problems persisted and multiplied. After less than two years of operation, the market was closed down. The Chinese government certainly wants to avoid an embarrassing repeat of the bond futures market fiasco, this time under the spotlight of the global financial press.
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